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FEDERALISM AND SUBNATIONAL
POLITICAL COMMUNITY

James A. Gardner*
One of the great strengths of federalism as a structure of constitutional governance is its flexibility. Federalism offers this flexibility at
two distinct points in the constitutional life cycle. During the initial
design phase, federal institutions can be calibrated to accommodate a
wide variety of political considerations, from demands for autonomy
by cultural or linguistic minorities, to concerns over efficiency and innovation in the generation and implementation of public policy, to civic fears concerning the protection of liberty. Perhaps even more important is the oft-remarked capacity of federal structures to adjust
themselves to changing conditions once a constitutional system is up
and running.1 On this view, changes in social and political facts on the

ground lead inevitably to changes in the goals and interests of national
and subnational governments. These changes lead in turn to evolution
in the grounds upon which such governments contest for power, producing corresponding adjustments to the allocation of power between
national and subnational governments and sometimes even to the nature and goals of the federal system itself.
In Partisan Federalism,2 Professor Jessica Bulman-Pozen argues
that American federalism has recently undergone just such a change,
evolving from its initial design as a system of contestation between
state and national polities to one of contestation between and among
geographically concentrated partisans of the two major national political parties. She welcomes this change, praising constitutional doctrines that enhance the porosity of state borders and advocating further legal change to facilitate the formation by citizens of multiple,
transborder subnational political identities. I have no serious quarrel
with Bulman-Pozen's descriptive claim, but I do have reservations
about the normative desirability of the changes she documents. These
changes, I fear, have the potential to undermine the most significant
design goal of American federalism: the protection of liberty

* Bridget and Thomas Black SUNY Distinguished Professor, SUNY Buffalo Law School,
The State University of New York.
1 See WILLIAM S. LIVINGSTON, FEDERALISM AND CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE II-12
(1956); Nathalie Behnke & Arthur Benz, The Politics of ConstitutionalChange Between Reform
and Evolution, 39 PUBLIUS 213, 2 16 (2009).

2 Jessica Bulman-Pozen, PartisanFederalism, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1077 (2o14).
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Unlike the federalism practiced in many other states, American
federalism has from the beginning opted for a relatively decentralized
model not to accommodate ethnonational claims of geographically
concentrated minorities, but to protect liberty by institutionalizing a
system of permanent intergovernmental contestation. 3 At a minimum,
federalism is said to achieve this goal by assigning to the states the
function of checking or resisting dangerous uses of national power and
by giving them power to do so effectively Somewhat more ambitiously, the federal system could be understood as authorizing states to improve the lives of Americans by resisting exercises of national power
that do not directly threaten liberty but are merely bad on the merits.
At the structural level, then, the important question is: What kind
of entities must American states be to perform these functions consistent with the constitutional plan? In my judgment, effective execution of the constitutional plan requires states to be political communities - the federalism constructed by the U.S. Constitution is meant to
pit political communities, rather than other kinds of communities,
against one another. This conclusion follows from three features possessed uniquely by formal political communities: their power, their
completeness, and their autonomy.
Power. The United States government is powerful, and its exercise
of power is democratically legitimate. Successful resistance to this
kind of power generally can be mounted only by powerful and equally
legitimate actors. In our system, political communities are by definition the principal bearers of this kind of power. To be sure, the function of checking national power can be and is exercised by other kinds
of organizations - political parties, private associations, the organized
press, civil society groups - but they do not possess formal, official
power, and such power is, in some circumstances, the only tool capable
of effectively resisting national misbehavior. These other manifestations of the checking function are pluralist, but they are not federal.
Completeness. Ideally, the kind of power wielded by governments
should not be entrusted to an incomplete community. To do so is, in
Madisonian terms, to hand over the levers of power to a "faction," 4 an
outcome that much of the institutional architecture of the U.S. Constitution is meant to prevent. Entrusting rule to political communities
lessens the risk of factional control because, unlike other kinds of
communities, a political community is capable, at least in principle, of
comprehending all the varieties of interests that a human community
can contain. Its decisions are decisions of a genuine polity, conferring

3 The idea is Madison's.

I describe the Madisonian account more fully in JAMES A.

GARDNER, INTERPRETING STATE CONSTITUTIONS 81-83 (2005).
4 THE FEDERALIST No. io (James Madison).
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on them an important form of presumptive legitimacy. This helps explain why we often worry about the wisdom and legitimacy of conferring the full weight of governmental authority on narrow and incomplete political entities such as capital cities (Buenos Aires, Mexico City)
or, in the international setting, microstates (Monaco, Liechtenstein) the same intuition that makes many Americans balk at the idea of elevating the District of Columbia to the status of a state. In all these
communities, the range of interests and human experience may be too
narrow to impart the kind of legitimacy a complete political community enjoys.
Autonomy. Finally, a political community is, in principle, the kind
of institution most capable of acting with true autonomy. Indeed, the
idea of an independent, free-standing political community is, in our
Lockean political tradition, the very definition of a genuinely autonomous actor, fully in charge, as much as fortune permits, of its own destiny. The autonomy enjoyed by political communities allows them in
turn to make independent and self-generated judgments about the two
most important considerations informing the contestatory dynamic of
federalism: the welfare of their citizens and the performance of the
federal government. The autonomy that political communities, and
only political communities, enjoy thus offers a stronger possibility than
other forms of communal organization for (a) improving the welfare of
subnational citizens and (b) effectively checking national power.
Seen in this light, Bulman-Pozen's story is a story of the diminishment of what states are. She claims that the identity of political communities defined by state boundaries has collapsed into a kind of
checkerboard of national partisan identity, at least for purposes relevant to federalism. This is plausible, and it may very well be descriptively accurate. I have worried about this phenomenon myself: in a
recent article, I argued that national political parties have served as
conduits through which national politics "colonizes" state politics,
thereby establishing the agenda and range of positions available to
5
state political actors.
Where I think we part company is over whether these developments pose any kind of problem. Bulman-Pozen argues, optimistically,
that enhancing the porosity of subnational borders and communities to
facilitate the formation of partisan state and individual political identities would mark a beneficial accommodation to the current reality. I
am less sanguine. The pertinent question, it seems to me, is not
whether "partisan federalism" is on its own merits an adequate, or sufficient, or even a superior form of federalism. The question, rather, is

5 James A. Gardner, The Myth of State Autonomy: Federalism,PoliticalParties, and the National Colonization of State Politics, 29 J.L. &POL. I, 17 (2013).
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whether states that function politically as outposts of the national political parties are capable of performing the checking and resistance
functions that the existing constitutional plan of federalism contemplates for them. Considered in terms of the three characteristics of political community reviewed earlier, there are grounds for doubt.
Power, of course, is not an issue under partisan federalism, or any
other kind: states will have at their disposal a considerable amount of
official, legitimate, governmental power so long as the system remains
one that is recognizably federal. The nub of Bulman-Pozen's argument, however, is that the levers of state power are being operated by
something other than autonomous political communities - that, as a
matter of contingent fact, states have become essentially branch offices
of the national political parties. If true, this development seems to me
worrisome from the point of view of the goals American federalism is
meant to achieve.
One important reason why this is the case is because a state community whose ideas and whose very identity are furnished by national
political parties is an incomplete community, one that by hypothesis
lacks the breadth and texture of human interests that a true political
community contains. Like any faction, such a community is unlikely
to generate a suitably broad and complete range of policy positions for
potential state adoption; on the contrary, it will be limited by definition
to those that appear on the agendas of national political parties. These
positions are especially likely to reflect a relatively narrow range of
views, since national parties by definition are compelled to adopt positions and commitments that appeal to national majorities - a very
significant limitation. Certainly a partisan state community will be
less capable than a complete political community of generating positions and preferences different from those made available on the menu
of national party commitments. Bulman-Pozen correctly observes that
state affiliates of national political parties can and sometimes do adopt
partisan positions that differ from those of the national parties, 6 but no
evidence of which I am aware suggests that state affiliates are capable
of taking positions that do not lie comfortably within a range of opinion defined by parameters established at the national level and oriented toward the possibility of appealing to the median national voter.
Perhaps even more worrisome is that a partisan state community
lacks the autonomy of a true political community Such a community
is less likely than a complete political community to be able to generate robust and independent conceptions of the common good, both of
the local populace itself and of the national polity Bulman-Pozen

6 The canonical work is ROBERT S. ERIKSON, GERALD C. WRIGHT, & JOHN P. MCIVER,
STATEHOUSE DEMOCRACY (1993).
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notes, again correctly, that the generation of independent conceptions
of the common good does not depend on some Romantic conception of
states as organic, Hegelian communities. It is more than sufficient that
states contain differing proportions of nationally distributed subpopulations, or that differing and contingent historical experiences produce
path-dependent divergences of opinion among state populations. 7 But
a state community that takes its identity from national political parties
is not, even in this more limited sense, a fully independent political
community, and thus lacks the degree of autonomy that American federalism seems to demand. Its close relation to and overlapping identity with national political parties make it dependent on those parties to
supply both a policy agenda and a set of positions to be taken up concerning items on that agenda. At the end of the day, what is missing
from such a community is a demos; it has no resources from which to
draw a conception of a distinct local or national common good - precisely the kinds of conceptions that federalism contemplates that states
will, in appropriate circumstances, offer in opposition to positions generated at the national level.
Even this situation might not undermine the contemplated operation of federalism if state polities could, whenever necessary, extract
themselves from alignment with national partisan positions to assert a
wider range of more distinctive, homegrown positions when necessary
to recognize, check, or resist bad national policy But can they? As
thinkers from Aristotle to John Stuart Mill have observed, citizenship
is a faculty that requires regular exercise. It is not at all clear that if
state residents stop thinking of themselves as, and acting like, citizens
of a subnational political community, they can simply dust off and reacquire the habit when circumstances demand. If not, then the only
available grounds for state resistance to national policy choices and actions may be partisan, yet partisan grounds may be too limited in
scope to fulfill the role that state power is meant to serve in the American system of federalism.
In sum, I agree with Bulman-Pozen that it is pointless to cling to
idealized notions of a federalism that no longer exists, if indeed it ever
did. The rise in the United States and around the globe during the
late twentieth century of regimes of robust, judicially enforced human
rights may well be testament to the demise of structural mechanisms
as meaningful constitutional constraints on government misbehavior.
Still, I think it is too early to abandon the American constitutional ideal of redundant systems of liberty protection, and we might therefore
consider how a meaningful state check on national power might be

7 GARDNER, INTERPRETING STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 3, ch. 2.
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preserved, even in a diminished form, before we agree to see it ushered
off the constitutional stage.

